SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses
of recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners.In so doing,
we hope to assist the legal community in keeping abreastof some of
the more interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-LOCAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLAN IMPOSING MORE STRINGENT MINORITY AND RESIDENT HIRING GOALS
THAN STATE PLAN NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL; STATE TREASUaEa'S
APPROVAL OF PLAN NOT ABUSE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY DisCRErION-United Building & Construction Trades Council v.
Mayor of Camden, 88 N.J. 317, 443 A.2d 148 (1982).
In 1975 the State of New Jersey amended the law Against Discrimination by enacting affirmative action programs. These programs
were an attempt to promote equal opportunity in the hiring of construction companies to engage in public works projects. N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 10:5-31 to :5-38 (West 1976 & Cum. Supp. 1981-1982). The
acts empowered the Chief Affirmative Action Officer (State Treasurer) to determine minority populations in specific areas, and based
on these determinations, to promulgate percentages as guidelines for
the affirmative action hiring program. Accordingly, the State Treasurer promulgated rules outlining the nature and goals of the affirmative action program in New Jersey. 88 N.J. at 322, 443 A.2d at 150;
see N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, §§ 27-1.1 to -13.2 (Supp. 1978). The
State Treasurer established a twenty percent minority hiring goal for
public works contracts in Camden County. 88 N.J. at 321, 443 A.2d
at 149.
In 1980, the Camden City Council enacted an ordinance establishing an affirmative action program instituting twenty-five percent
as the minority hiring goal. The City Council adopted a second ordinance providing that no less than forty percent of the labor force
should be from the city of Camden. Id. at 323, 443 A.2d at 151. The
Chief Affirmative Action Officer approved both ordinances leading
United Building & Construction Trades Council (Council) to appeal
this decision to the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior
Court pursuant to N.J. CT. R. 2:2-3. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey certified the appeal directly on June 19, 1981. 88 N.J. at 324,
443 A.2d at 151.
The Council urged that the State Treasurer did not have the
power to approve Camden's ordinance increasing the minimum minority percentage from twenty percent to twenty-five percent thereby
establishing goals that were more stringent than those applicable
county-wide. The Council also maintained that even if the power
existed, it could not be exercised without a showing of necessity. They
further questioned the authority of the State Treasurer to establish
"resident hiring quotas at all." Id. at 325, 443 A.2d at 150.
Justice Pashman, writing for a unanimous court, noted that N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-36 (a) gave the State Treasurer broad authority to
establish the guidelines of the affirmative action program. Although
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the statute does not require the use of county-wide goals, the court
asserted that the Treasurer's establishment of county-wide goals did
not preclude variations within the county, particularly when a municipality's percentage of minorities varied substantially from the county's. 88 N.J. at 327, 443 A.2d at 153. Finding that the city ordinance
in no way impeded accomplishment of the legislature's goals, the
court held that the Treasurer's approval of Camden's twenty-five
percent hiring goals was neither ultra vires nor an abuse of agency
power. Furthermore, the court held that the approval of Camden's
forty percent residency requirement was not ultra vires, even though
the agency's enabling legislation did not set forth specific residency
requirements. It noted that authority for local actions of this nature
could be found impliedly in the Law Against Discrimination, or
through the municipality's general police powers. The court held that
as long as the local percentage figures were consistent with the minimum figures established by the state and served the overall purpose of
the affirmative action program, approval by the State Treasurer was
not ultra vires.
The court observed, however, that the mere fact that the acts
were not ultra vires did not immunize them from constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 329, 443 A.2d at 154. In reviewing the constitutional
arguments, the court dismissed the assertion that the Council was not
attacking fundamental affirmative action rules, but rather, was challenging the particular goals in Camden. Finding this position untenable, the court decided that there was essentially no difference between an attack on the Camden rules or an attack on those of the
overall affirmative action plan. Id. at 330, 443 A.2d at 154. The court
observed that there was authority upholding affirmative action programs involving government contracts. The court noted that in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), the United States Supreme
Court upheld provisions of the Public Works Employment Act of
1977, §§ 102-104, 91 Stat. 116, 116-17, requiring that ten percent of
federal funds committed to state and local public works projects be set
aside for minority businesses. 88 N.J. at 333, 443 A.2d at 156. As
additional authority, the court cited Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp.
1284 (D.N.J. 1970), in which the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey upheld a more stringent affirmative action
program in public contracting than the one at issue in the present
case. 88 N.J. at 331, 443 A.2d at 155.
The New Jersey Supreme Court also analyzed and distinguished
its present decision from its decision in Lige v. Town of Montclair, 72
N.J. 5, 367 A.2d 833 (1976). In Lige, the court rejected an affirmative
action program which required that one minority member be hired
for every nonminority firefighter and police officer until a certain
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percentage was reached. The court maintained that in Lige, it had
rejected the affirmative action program because of the particular
"unfairness of [the] rigid quotas" when such quotas are imposed irrespective of qualification. The court noted, however, that the Camden
plan, on the other hand, in which hiring goals rather than quotas
were at issue, required a contractor to make only a reasonable effort
to achieve the contemplated goal. Accordingly, the court concluded
that the reasonable effort standard coupled with the emphasis on
hiring goals rather than quotas regardless of qualification, distinguished these two cases. 88 N.J. at 335, 443 A.2d at 157.
The court also rejected the Council's argument that the residency
requirement violated the commerce clause, the privileges and immunities clause, and the equal protection clause. Id. at 338-43, 443 A.2d
at 158-61. The Supreme Court of New Jersey in dismissing the commerce clause argument maintained that challenges alleging impermissible burdens on interstate commerce had always been premised on
"state taxes and regulatory measures impeding private trade in the
national marketplace." Id. at 338, 443 A.2d at 158. The court held,
however, in this instance that the city was not regulating the market
but rather participating in it, and as market participant, was free to
prefer its own residents even though it had engaged private contractors. Id. at 338-41, 443 A.2d at 158-60. The court in dismissing the
privileges and immunities clause argument stated that the clause was
intended to ensure that citizens of all states would be afforded identical rights and protections. The court maintained that since Camden's
regulation had the same "effects upon out-of-state citizens and New
Jersey citizens not residing in the locality" there was no disparate
treatment afforded out-of-state residents. Id. at 341-42, 443 A.2d at
160. The court also rejected the Council's equal protection argument
noting that a city's decision to hire its own residents to promote full
employment within the city satisfied the requisite rational basis review applied to legislation affecting nonfundamental rights. Id. at
342-43, 443 A.2d at 161.
Finally, the court rejected the Council's argument that the residency requirement imposed by the Camden plan was preempted by the
state legislative program. Noting that "state preemption analysis parallels the federal analysis" the court stated that the state program did not
expressly or impliedly preclude municipalities from establishing local
residency hiring requirements. Id. at 343-46, 443 A.2d at 161-62.
By affirming the State Treasurer's acceptance of Camden's affirmative action plan and approving the plan itself, the New Jersey
Supreme Court demonstrated its commitment to the use of hiring
guidelines as a means of promoting equal opportunity employment.
Furthermore, the court's acceptance of a municipality's use of upward
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adjustments in minority hiring and approval of the institution of
residency illustrates the court's intent to allow local governments
broad discretion in formulating hiring programs which are most suitable to its needs.
S.M.F.

CIVIL PROCEDURE -PLEADING-

COMPLAINT DISMISSED FOR VIOLATION OF DISCOVERY RULES BARS NEW COMPLAINT ONLY WHEN
EXPLICITLY SO ORDERED; STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS NOT AVAILABLE AS DEFENSE WHEN DEFENDANT CONTRIBUTED TO DELAY IN

BRINGING SECOND

ACTIN-Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 440

A.2d 1329 (1982).
Plaintiffs, Anthony and Eugenia Zaccardi, initiated a medical
malpracatice suit against defendants, doctors George L. Becker and
Jerome Bellet, on January 30, 1976 by filing a complaint to recover
damages in connection with treatment Anthony received from 1974 to
1975. (Zaccardi I) 88 N.J. 249, 440 A.2d at 1331. As a result of the
plaintiffs' failure to answer interrogatories, the trial court dismissed
the complaint pursuant to N.J.CT.R. 4:23-5 (a) on July 28, 1976. 88

N.J. at 249-50, 440 A.2d at 1331. The case remained on the docket for
seventeen months and was adjourned for discovery at least ten times,
during which time the plaintiffs made no mention of the dismissal to
the trial court and the defendants made no objection to the repeated
adjournments. Id. at 250, 440 A.2d at 1331. On December 28, 1977,
the plaintiffs moved to vacate the dismissal and requested a sixty day
extension, which motions were granted by the trial court on February
10, 1978. The appellate division reversed and reinstated the original
order of dismissal on September 28, 1978, 162 N.J. Super. 329, 392
A.2d 1220 (App. Div. 1978), and the New Jersey Supreme Court
denied certification. 79 N.J. 454, 401 A.2d 221 (1978).
On November 17, 1978, one month before the denial of certification in Zaccardi I, a second complaint, identical to the first, was filed
by the plaintiffs. (Zaccardi II). Holding that the prior dismissal of
Zaccardi I had been a final determination and that the two year
statute of limitations had run, the trial court dismissed the second
complaint, and the appellate division affirmed. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification and reversed. 88 N.J. at 250, 440
A.2d at 1331.
In reinstating the plaintiffs' case, the court explored the applicable standard for determining when a dismissal for failure to answer
interrogatories bars the filing of a new complaint. Justice Pashman,

writing for the majority, observed that under N.J.CT.R. 4:23-5 (a),
dismissal for failure to answer interrogatories is without prejudice
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because it is generally based on an ex parte application of the party
seeking discovery. Moreover, dismissal is not necessarily final because
not only may a motion be made to vacate the dismissal within thirty
days of service of the order upon compliance with required procedure,
but in addition, N.J.CT.R. 1:1-2 grants the court discretion to relax
the thirty day period in the interest of preventing injustice. 88 N.J. at
251, 440 A.2d at 1332. The majority then noted that when a decision
is made not to vacate a dismissal, the court must also decide if this
decision to vacate is to be with or without prejudice. In considering
this, the court will balance the defendant's right to have the plaintiff
comply with procedural rules against the plaintiff's right to adjudication on the merits. Id. at 252, 440 A.2d at 1332. The court has
available a range of sanctions to assure protection of these competing
rights. Id. at 252-53, 440 A.2d at 1332. Dismissal with prejudice is
"the ultimate sanction" and is usually not ordered unless the prejudice
suffered by the nondelinquent party can be remedied in no other way
or the litigant rather than his attorney was at fault. Id. at 253, 440
A.2d at 1332-33. The court noted that absent a specific order that the
dismissal is with prejudice, dismissal is without prejudice, despite the
presence of strong disapproving language in the judicial opinion. Id.
at 254, 440 A.2d at 1333. Courts may nevertheless dismiss a second
complaint on equitable grounds even though the first complaint was
dismissed without prejudice. Justice Pashman stated that this severe
sanction of dismissal would be utilized only when the second complaint was filed to harass the defendant, the delay has prejudiced the
ability of the defendant to defend his case, or equitable considerations
warrant dismissal. Id. at 253, 440 A.2d at 1333.
In applying these criteria, the court concluded that Zaccardi I
had been dismissed without prejudice since the order did not state
otherwise and plaintiffs' second complaint was not barred thereby.
Id. at 254, 440 A.2d at 1333. With regard to whether the new
complaint should be barred on equitable grounds, Justice Pashman
was highly critical of the plaintiffs' attorney's failure to advise the trial
court of the dismissal of Zaccardi I. If this action were taken alone,
the sanctions would presumably be severe. Id. at 255, 440 A.2d at
1333. However, the court recognized that the defendants had in effect
contributed to the lengthy delay by failing to notify the plaintiffs and
the court of any objection to the adjournments, id., 440 A.2d at 133334, and this could reasonably be taken as implied consent to continuation of the case. Thus, equitable considerations did not require dismissal of the plaintiffs' second complaint. Id., 440 A.2d at 1334.
Turning to whether the statute of limitations could be raised to
bar a second complaint, Justice Pashman stated that although statutes
of limitations are designed to prevent the trying of cases on the basis of
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outdated evidence, they are subject to judicial modification when they
would unnecessarily work an injustice given the equities of a particular case. Id. at 256, 440 A.2d at 1334. Noting that this defense had
often been barred when the defendant had contributed to the delay,
id. at 257, 440 A.2d at 1335, the court found that the defendants'
counsel was under a duty to bring the dismissal to the trial court's
attention, thus the defendants should share the blame for the long
delay. Id. at 257-58, 440 A.2d at 1335. Any hardship resulting from
the imposition of this duty was outweighed by the plaintiffs' interest
in having their claim adjudicated on the merits. Id. at 258, 440 A.2d
at 1335. Therefore, despite the running of the two year statute, the
defendants were barred from raising it as an affirmative defense.
Justice Schreiber, concurring and dissenting, was in favor of reversal to allow litigation on the application of the statute of limitations. He
questioned the propriety of the majority's establishing the criteria for
deciding the issue, id. at 263, 440 A.2d at 1338 (Schreiber, J., concurring and dissenting), and called for a more concrete application of the
statute. Upon a determination of when the cause of action accrued, the
suit would be barred unless the two year period had not run. Id. at 262,
440 A.2d at 1337 (Schreiber, J., concurring and dissenting). Due to the
acts of both parties he would, however, toll the statute for the seventeen
months that ZaccardiI was on the court docket. Id. at 261, 440 A.2d at
1337 (Schreiber, J., concurring and dissenting).
Justice Pollock dissented, disagreeing with the majority's justifications in equitably estopping the defendants from pleading the statute of limitations. He feared that the ultimate result would be a
frustration of the purpose of the statute and an unstable judiciary and
thus called for a strict application of the statute of limitations in this
factual setting. Id. at 269, 440 A.2d at 1341 (Pollock, J., dissenting).
Despite the opinions of Justices Schreiber and Pollock, the majority has stated a clear test to deal with the difficult problem arising out
of this procedural technicality. The test allows the equitable considerations of both parties to be balanced to maintain the integrity of the
judicial system and provide fairness for all parties.
C.A.C

COMMERCIAL LAW-UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-UCC PRESERVES PERFECT TENDER RULE; REJEcTION DoEs NOT TERMINATE

CONTRACT; SELLER MAY EFFECT CuRE To PREVENT UNFAIR REJEC-

TIoN-Ramirez v. Autosport, 88 N.J. 277, 440 A.2d 1345 (1982).
Plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Ramirez, entered into a contract for the
sale of a recreational van with defendant, Autosport, on July 20,
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1978. The contract provided for a purchase price of $14,100 with a
$4,700 trade-in allowance and set delivery date for the van on or
about August 3, 1978. Ramirez left the trade-in vehicle with Autosport and returned on the delivery date to pick up the van. The van
had several defects-paint scratches, missing sewer hookups, and uninstalled hubcaps. 88 N.J. at 282, 440 A.2d at 1347. Upon the advice
of an Autosport salesman, Ramirez did not accept the van. After
several telephone conversations, Autosport notified Ramirez that the
van was ready and on August 14, 1978, the couple returned to Autosport. The exterior work had not been completed and the dining area
cushions were soaking wet. Autosport agreed to remedy these defects,
and the Ramirez couple left without the van. Id. at 282, 440 A.2d at
1348. On October 5, 1978, the parties met at Autosport for a second
time, failed to negotiate an agreement, and Ramirez requested the
return of the trade-in vehicle. Unbeknownst to Ramirez, Autosport
sold the trade-in vehicle later that month. Id. at 283, 440 A.2d at
1348.
Mr. and Mrs. Ramirez instituted suit against Autosport on November 20, 1978, seeking rescission of the contract and restitution. Id.
at 283, 288, 440 A.2d at 1348, 1357. Autosport counterclaimed for
breach of contract. Id. at 283, 440 A.2d at 1348. In an unreported
decision, the trial court determined that the plaintiffs had a right to
rescind the contract and awarded the fair market value of the trade-in
vehicle as damages. The appellate division affirmed in an unreported
per curiam opinion. See id. at 281, 440 A.2d 1347.
On certification, the New Jersey Supreme Court examined several provisions of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, adopted
in New Jersey as N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 12A:1-101 to :2-725 (West 1962)
(hereinafter UCC or the Code) and held that the UCC preserved the
perfect tender rule of general contract law by permitting a buyer to
reject nonconforming goods while mitigating the harshness of that
rule through the Code's provisions for revocation of acceptance and
cure. 88 N.J. at 287, 290, 440 A.2d at 1350, 1352. Thus, the court
noted that a contract is not automatically terminated upon the buyer's
rejection; rather, preservation of the contract is sought through the
Code's attempts to balance the interests of the parties and encourage
communication and negotiation between the parties. See id. at 285,
440 A.2d at 1349.
As the court observed, however, the balancing of the interests is
dependent upon whether the buyer has accepted the goods. Before
acceptance, the buyer may reject the goods for any nonconformity but
the seller has an unconditional right to cure. Id. at 285, 440 A.2d at
1349. After acceptance, the buyer may revoke his acceptance but only
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if the nonconformity substantially impairs the value of the goods. Id.
at 286, 440 A.2d at 1349. The court determined that the case at bar
involved rejection prior to acceptance and accordingly proceeded to
examine the Code's remedy provisions. In discussing the absence of
the term "rescission" from the remedy provisions of the Code, the
court noted that revocation of acceptance was intended to provide the
buyer with the same relief as rescission. Id. at 288, 440 A.2d at 135051. Nevertheless, since this was a case of rejection before acceptance,
consideration of revocation was unnecessary. Accordingly, the appropriate Code remedy available to the plaintiffs was cancellation of the
contract and recovery of the price they had already paid for the new
van. Id. at 288-89, 440 A.2d at 1351. The court determined that the
only remaining issue was whether Autosport had effected a cure
within a reasonable time given the buyer's right to reject delivery of
the goods. Answering in the negative, the court held that the plaintiffs
were entitled to cancel the contract and recover the fair market value
of their trade-in vehicle as the appropriate remedy. Id. at 291, 440
A.2d at 1352.
The supreme court utilized this case to set forth its position on
several UCC provisions. The court expressly disapproved of the decisions in Ventura v. Ford Motor Corp., 173 N.J. Super. 501, 414 A.2d
611 (Ch. Div. 1980) (alternate remedy would have been rescission
under UCC) and Pavesi v. Ford Motor Corp., 155 N.J. Super. 373,
382 A.2d 954 (App. Div. 1978) (right to cure after acceptance limited
to trivial defects) to the extent that these decisions recognized rescission as a remedy under the Code and approved Edelstein v. Toyota
Motors Distributors, 176 N.J. Super. 57, 422 A.2d 101 (App. Div.
1980) (revocation of acceptance is rescission) and Sudol v. Rudy Papa
Motors, 175 N.J. Super. 238, 417 A.2d 1133 (Dist. Ct. 1980) (rescission no longer exists as such under UCC), which recognized that
rescission had been replaced by specific Code remedies. See 88 N.J. at
287-88, 440 A.2d at 1350-51.
Recognizing the more realistic approach of the Code, the court
focused a portion of its opinion on the pre-Code limitation of the
rescission remedy to instances of material breach. Although the Code
has incorporated this aspect of the rescission remedy in terms of
revocation of acceptance when goods are "substantially impaired,"
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-711, the rejection provision allows cancellation, a remedy unavailable prior to the Cade, for minor defects.
Thus, under the Code, a buyer is no longer compelled to accept
nonconforming, although not substantially impaired goods leaving
him to seek damages for any loss incurred. 88 N.J. at 289, 440 A.2d at
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1351-52. The court left unresolved, however, whether rescission has
survived as a remedy outside the Code for situations not warranting
revocation or cancellation, such as fraud or mistake. Id. at 288, 440
A.2d at 1351.
The court has utilized a factually simplistic case to illustrate
several of the basic operating principles of the Code and to correct
inadvertences in prior law. The more interesting, complex questions
(e.g., what action constitutes acceptance, the methods of measuring
damages, the total applicability of the rescission remedy) have been
left for future consideration. The decision reads no differently than a
hornbook explanation of the mechanics of the Code with all the vague
difficulties left for an advanced course in Commercial Law.
H.K.H.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS-DIVORCE-LICENSE OR DEGREE DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE PROPERTY

SUBJECT

TO

EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION

DIVORCE SETTLEMENT; FOLLOWING SEPARATION,

IN

ACTION FOR UN-

JUST ENRICHMENT UNAVAILABLE FOR ONE WHO SUPPORTS SPOUSE
IN FURTHERANCE OF EDUCATION, HOWEVER, EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS MAY MANDATE APPLICATION OF TRADITIONAL REMEDIES-

Mahoney v. Mahoney, 182 N.J. Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062 (App.
Div. 1982); Hill v. Hill, 182 N.J. Super. 616, 442 A.2d 1072
(App. Div. 1982).

June and Melvin Mahoney were married in 1971 and thereafter
resided in Indiana until the summer of 1975, at which time Mr.
Mahoney left his position as a captain in the Air Force and, with his
wife, moved to New Jersey. In order to further his career, Mr. Mahoney enrolled in the Wharton School of Business Administration and
received his master's degree sixteen months later, in January 1977. 182
N.J. Super. at 601, 442 A.2d at 1064. While attending Wharton, Mr.
Mahoney was supported by his wife who was employed as a medical
technologist at a salary of $20,000 a year. Id. at 601-02, 442 A.2d at

1064. She continued this employment after Mr. Mahoney received his
MBA and began working as a commercial lending officer for Chase
Manhattan Bank at a salary "roughly commensurate" with that of his
wife. For the next twenty months, both husband and wife contributed
equally to their joint household expenses. In October 1978, the Mahoneys separated, and in March 1979, Mr. Mahoney sued for divorce.
Id. at 602, 442 A.2d at 1064. No substantial assets had been accumulated during the marriage and Mrs. Mahoney entered no claims for
alimony. The only financial question presented to the court was
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whether Mrs. Mahoney should receive one-half of the financial support she provided for her husband while he attended school. Specifically, Mrs. Mahoney claimed entitlement to approximately $15,500.
Id. at 602-03, 442 A.2d at 1065.
Anita and Robert Hill were married in 1973. In 1974 Mrs. Hill
enrolled in medical school, but she chose to withdraw in May 1975. In
June 1975, the couple moved from Albany, New York to New Jersey
where Mr. Hill entered dental school. In May 1976, following a year
of unemployment, Mrs. Hill began to work as an assistant scientist in
a commercial laboratory. In the fall of 1978, while Mr. Hill was in his
last year of dental school, the Hills separated. Mrs. Hill filed for
divorce in the summer of 1979. When Mrs. Hill filed the complaint,
Mr. Hill was finishing his residency in oral surgery at a salary of
$15,500. 182 N.J. Super. at 618, 442 A.2d at 1973. The court was
again presented with the question whether Mrs. Hill should receive
one-half of the contributions she made towards joint living expenses
while Mr. Hill attended dental school. For the period during which
she worked for the commercial laboratory and he attended school,
specifically, between May 1976 and October 1978, Mrs. Hill earned
an estimated $36,000, all of which went towards their mutual support. Id. at 619, 442 A.2d at 1973.
In both Mahoney and Hill, the chancery division judges determined that the wives' contribution to household expenses during the
period of their husbands' schooling was substantial enough to warrant
reimbursement. In Mahoney, the appellate division noted that the
trial court had based its conclusion on the wife's presumed expectation
of future benefit in supporting the husband through school, and to
ignore the contributions of the wife during such schooling would be to
unjustly enrich the husband. 182 N.J. Super. at 603, 442 A.2d at 1065.
The degree earned by Mr. Mahoney thereby constituted a property
right for which a reasonable consideration should be returned to the
wife. The trial judge did not, however, allow Mrs. Mahoney to recover her full claim-one-half of all disbursements made in support of
her husband. Rather, the judge awarded Mrs. Mahoney a "reasonable
sum," and estimated $5,000 in this situation, for her previous household maintenance expenses. The appellate division also observed that
the trial court in Hill, applying primarily the same rationale used in
Mahoney, had awarded Mrs. Hill a full reimbursement of one-half the
amount she expended while Mr. Hill was in school. The trial judge
concluded in an oral opinion that to do otherwise would not only
unjustly enrich Mr. Hill but also ignore the "potential property status
of professional training." 182 N.J. Super. at 620, 442 A.2d at 1074.
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Judge Pressler, writing for the three-judge court in the appellate
division, reversed both the Mahoney and Hill decisions. Before advancing the substantive arguments of the court, Judge Pressler stressed
the need to clarify the grounds for recent doctrinally chaotic rationales. Judge Pressler observed that recent cases had merged the theoretically separate issues of whether a license or degree constituted a
distributable marital asset and whether equitable remedies existed for
spouses who have contributed financially to the attainment of these
degrees. 182 N.J. Super. at 604, 442 A.2d at 1065-66. Judge Pressler
held that although these issues were distinct, they did bear a correlative relationship. This correlative relationship was illustrated by what
Judge Pressler held to be the proper analytical approach to these types
of claims. She maintained: If the degree were deemed to constitute
distributable marital property, then the rules of equitable distribution
applied; however, if the degree were deemed not to be such an asset,
then the grounds for formulating an equitable remedy had to be
examined.
The appellate division held that a license or degree did not
constitute "property" within recognized definitional limits. Referring
to the Colorado Supreme Court's opinion in In re Marriage of
Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 432, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978), the court
analogized a professional degree to other recognized property assets in
terms of definitional characteristics such as marketability and alienability, and concluded that a degree is more an embodiment of abstracts than a concrete, divisable property asset. 182 N.J. Super. at
605, 442 A.2d at 1066. The court observed that when a degree is
claimed to be distributable property, one is essentially referring to the
"enhanced earning capacity" expected from such a degree. The spouse
traditionally seeks remuneration not for the degree itself but for the
lost expectation that he or she would share in a future increased
income by virtue of such a degree. Because the New Jersey Supreme
Court has deemed that "earning capacity" specifically falls outside the
generally expansive definitional limits of distributable property, the
degree, which is merely the predicate of enhanced earning capacity,
could not be considered to be distributable property. Id. at 606-07,
442 A.2d at 1067 (citing Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 345, 331 A.2d
257, 260 (1975)). Furthermore, the appellate division noted that previous cases established that once such enhanced earning capacity is
realized, consideration is no longer given to the "property" nature of
such capacity. Rather, the enhanced earning capacity simply becomes
an element factored into the calculation determining alimony. Id. at
607-09, 442 A.2d at 1067-68. The court observed that circumstances
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cannot dictate whether an object constitutes property. If a degree is
not property once the benefits of increased earning capacity are realized, neither can it be property prior to the realization of those
benefits. Id. at 608, 442 A.2d at 1068.
Having concluded that a degree does not constitute "property,"
the court next determined whether an equitable remedy should nevertheless be available for the supporting spouse. Noting that a majority
of courts has framed such a remedy in terms of an "investment loss,"
id. at 611, 442 A.2d at 1069, the Mahoney court took a substantially
different view. Finding that a marital relationship should not be
characterized as a commercial venture, the court held that contributions made consensually during the marriage should not be denominated as investment losses when the marriage itself fails. Financial
contributions made in support of a spouse's schooling should be
treated no differently than the many other nonfinancial sacrifices
made by both spouses over the course of the marriage. Id. at 612, 442
A.2d at 1070. The Mahoney court concluded that when a decision "as
to a husband's further training was mutual, consensual and made
with full understanding of the sacrifices that necessarily accompanied
the decision," id. at 614, 442 A.2d at 1071 (citing Wisner v. Wisner,
129 Ariz. 333, 341, 631 P.2d 115, 123 (Ct. App. 1981)), the resulting
degree did not unjustly enrich the husband after the couple separated,
thus no grounds for an equitable remedy existed. The court, however,
did note that there are circumstances which may call for an equitable
remedy. The Mahoney court maintained that if an inequity exists at
the termination of the marriage, a court may examine these inequitable considerations and, if necessary, apply conventional remedies. The
court noted that an inequity may be present if a wife postpones her
education because of the constraints of the marriage. If upon divorce,
the wife desires to continue her education, the courts should invoke
"rehabilitative alimony" so as to enable such continuation. Id. at 615,
442 A.2d at 1071-72; see, e.g., Hill, 182 N.J. Super. at 620-21, 442
A.2d at 1074-75.
Mahoney v. Mahoney and Hill v. Hill, the companion case,
specifically hold that degrees are not property thus precluding inclusion of these degrees as part of the property settlement in divorce
actions. The cases also illustrate that one's claims against a spouse for
unjust enrichment because of one's financial contributions leading to a
degree and future benefits will succeed only if special circumstances
are present. These holdings indicate that the New Jersey courts are
reluctant to interfere in the marital relationship absent a compelling
reason. Mahoney and Hill exemplify the courts' belief that the marital
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relationship is one which should remain personal to the involved
parties and free from unjustified intrusions by the judiciary.
S.A.M.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS-DIVORCE-WIDoW ENTITLED To SHARE
IN WRONGFUL DEATH AWARD WHERE CHILD OF DECEDENT FAILED

To

OVERCOME

PRESUMPTIVE VALIDITY OF WIDOW'S FOREIGN

VORCE AND MARRIAGE TO

DI-

DECEDENT-Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88

N.J. 529, 443 A.2d 1031 (1982).
This case first arose as a suit for the wrongful death of Melvin
Newburgh who was killed by Leon Arrigo in an automobile accident
in 1975. 88 N.J. at 529, 443 A.2d at 1031. Melvin's wife, Joan, was
appointed administratrix of his estate, and she was also appointed
administratrix ad prosequendum in order to bring the wrongful death
action. That claim was eventually settled for $100,000. However,
Joan and Steven, Melvin's son by a prior marriage, could not agree on
the division of the settlement. Although he consented to Joan's appointment as administratrix and to the intestate distribution of
Melvin's estate, id. at 535, 443 A.2d at 1033, Steven argued that Joan
should not be permitted to share the settlement money with him
because, he claimed, her Mexican divorce from her first husband was
invalid. Id. at 534, 443 A.2d at 1033. Joan's first marriage had been
dissolved in Mexico in 1962 in an uncontested action, in which her
first husband did not appear personally. She remarried and the second
marriage ended in a divorce granted in New Jersey. Joan's marriage to
Melvin was her third. Prior to both her second marriage and her
marriage to Melvin, Joan informed the clerk of the first marriage and
its subsequent dissolution in Mexico. Id. at 535, 443 A.2d at 1033.
The trial court ordered a hearing to determine the division of the
settlement money. The court found that the evidence offered by
Steven was insufficient to overcome the presumptive validity of the
first divorce and the marriage between Joan and Melvin. Id. at 536,
443 A.2d at 1034. The trial court also ruled that Steven was barred by
estoppel and laches from challenging the validity of the Mexican
divorce and that upon reaching age eighteen, he had no right to
further support from Melvin. The settlement was therefore divided
eighty percent for Joan and twenty percent for Steven. On appeal, the
appellate division reversed and remanded to the trial court for a
hearing on the validity of the Mexican divorce and the validity of
application of estoppel and laches. The court also disagreed with the
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trial court's conclusion that Steven was not entitled to support after
reaching age eighteen. Id. at 534, 443 A.2d at 1033.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed in part and affirmed
in part the decision of the appellate division. In finding that Steven
failed to overcome the presumption of the validity of the Mexican
divorce and the marriage between Joan and Melvin, the court held
that the strong presumption of the validity of the latest marriage can
only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence of a prior valid
marriage not terminated by divorce or death before the most recent
marriage. Furthermore, when attacking the validity of a foreign divorce, the court noted that the challenger has the burden of proof
with respect to each alleged defect. Id. at 538, 443 A.2d at 1035. The
court observed that Steven failed to prove each of these claims. Id. at
539, 443 A.2d at 1035. Nevertheless, Steven was not estopped by his
own actions or by his father's actions from attacking the validity of
Joan's first divorce and her marriage to Melvin. Id. at 541, 443 A.2d
at 1037. The court affirmed the appellate division's finding that
Steven's right to support from his father was not automatically terminated when he reached age eighteen; instead, it held that the right to
support depends on whether the child is emancipated. Id. at 542, 443
A.2d at 1037. Thus, on remand, the court ordered the trial court to
determine if Steven had established that his father would have contributed to his college and law school educations, and to what extent.
Id. at 546, 443 A.2d at 1039.
Justice Pashman concurring would have gone further than the
majority and based the decision on the right of a de facto spouse to
recover for wrongful death when a seemingly legitimate marriage is
technically defective. Id. at 547, 443 A.2d at 1040 (Pashman, J.,
concurring). In a separate concurrence, Justice Handler disagreed
with the majority's holding that the presumptive validity of the most
recent marriage should determine the right to recover under the
Wrongful Death Act. Id. at 549, 443 A.2d at 1041 (Handler, J.,
concurring). He found that the doctrine of equitable estoppel was
uniquely suited to matrimonial actions, id. at 551, 443 A.2d at 1042.
(Handler, J., concurring), and in this case, would act to bar Steven
from challenging the validity of Joan's Mexican divorce and third
marriage in the interests of equity, fairness, and passage of time. Id.
at 550, 443 A.2d at 1041 (Handler, J., concurring).
The Supreme Court of New Jersey followed the established rule
favoring the most recent marriage as valid. In so doing, it placed the
burden on the challenger to disprove by clear and convincing evidence
the validity of the most recent marriage. By placing a high burden of
proof on the defendant to establish each alleged defect in the mar-
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riage, the Arrigo court has illustrated its intent to recognize the most
recent marriage as valid except in clear instances indicating the contrary.
D.L.P.

EVIDENCE-ExPERT TESTIMONY-PSYCHIATRIST'S EXPERT TESTIMONY INADMISSIBLE To SHOW THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT POSSESS
PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAITS OF RAPIST-State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508,
443 A.2d 1020 (1982).
On June 16, 1977, the victim went to a local bar where she met
and conversed with the defendants, Michael Cavallo and David
Murro. The defendants invited her to Cavallo's car to smoke marijuana, but the victim alleged that after they arrived at the car, the
defendants told her that the marijuana was at Cavallo's house. After
the plaintiff agreed to go to Cavallo's house, the defendants instead
allegedly drove her to an empty field where they raped her. 88 N.J. at
512, 443 A.2d at 1022. According to the defendants, however, they
and the victim did smoke marijuana while driving around in the car
whereupon the victim and Murro began to embrace. The defendants
further alleged that after arriving at an empty field, the victim and
Murro engaged in sex in the backseat and the victim subsequently
asked Cavallo to join them in consensual sexual activity. Defendants
Cavallo and Murro were subsequently indicted for abduction, sodomy, private lewdness, and rape. Id. at 513, 443 A.2d at 1022. Since
there were no witnesses to the incident, the trial necessarily centered
on the credibility of the conflicting testimony of the parties. At trial,
Cavallo sought to introduce the expert character testimony of Dr.
Kuris, a psychiatrist. Dr. Kuris would testify that the defendant
Cavallo did not have the psychological traits of a rapist. The trial
judge ruled that this testimony was inadmissible. Id. at 512, 443 A.2d
at 1022. After a jury trial, the defendants were convicted of rape,
abduction and private lewdness, and acquitted of sodomy. Id. at 513,
443 A.2d at 1022. The defendants jointly appealed this decision challenging the correctness of the trial court's ruling excluding under N.J.
R. EvID. 47 and 56 the expert character testimony. 88 N.J. at 512, 443
A.2d at 1021. The appellate division affirmed the conviction in an
unpublished per curiam opinion holding the expert testimony inadmissible, and noting that rule 47 did not "contemplate testimony of
the kind proferred in this case." Id. at 513-14, 443 A.2d at 1022. The
Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification. 87 N.J. 370, 434
A.2d 1058 (1981).
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In its analysis the supreme court referred to N.J. R. EvIo. 47
which provides that character opinion testimony is admissible. The
court stated that because rule 47 makes no distinction between expert
and lay opinion, both are admissible; however, the court observed
that for expert opinion to be admissible it has to "qualify as proper
expert evidence." Thus, expert opinion evidence is admissible provided that a proper foundation is laid for the expert's testimony and
the evidence satisfies the requirements of rule 56 (2). 88 N.J. at 51415, 443 A.2d at 1023.
As a preliminary matter the state argued that the proferred expert opinion evidence was irrelevant. The court rejected this argument and stated that evidence is relevant if it "renders the desired
inference more probable than it would be without the evidence." Id.
at 515, 443 A.2d at 1023 (quoting State v. Deatore, 70 N.J. 100, 116,
358 A.2d 163, 172 (1976)). The court ruled that this evidence was
clearly relevant since it had the "tendency to create doubts as to
whether the defendant committed the offense charged." Id. at 515-16,
443 A.2d at 1023. Having established the relevancy of the testimony
and the general admissibility of expert character testimony under rule
47, the court looked to the special limitations placed on expert evidence by N.J. R. EVID. 56 (2). These limitations concern the qualifications of the expert and the reliability of the testimony. Since no
challenge was made to Dr. Kuris's qualifications, the only question
remaining was whether the testimony had a "sufficient scientific basis
to produce uniform and reasonably reliable results and [would] contribute materially to the ascertainment of the truth." 88 N.J. at 51617, 443 A.2d at 1024 (quoting State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 352, 230
A.2d 384, 389 (1967)). Thus, the true issue before the court was
whether there exists a reasonably reliable scientific basis by which an
expert can determine whether one has the personality of one unlikely
to have committed rape. Id. at 517, 443 A.2d at 1024. The court
maintained that the psychiatrist intended to testify that the defendant
did not have the character traits of a rapist. The court observed that
this testimony assumes both an ability to identify certain mental
characteristics peculiar to rapists and an ability to ascertain whether a
particular individual possesses these characteristics. Id. at 518, 443
A.2d at 1025. For the evidence to be admissible, proponents must
show that the basis for these assumptions is reliable.
The court rejected the defendants' argument that the reliability
of the proffered expert testimony should determine the weight of the
evidence rather than its admissibility. To support this position, the
court recalled that several of its prior opinions had recognized the
dangers of admitting unreliable scientific evidence. One apparent
danger is the prejudice which results when juries give excessive weight
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to the testimony because it is "labeled as 'scientific' and 'expert.' " Id.
In addition, the court noted that admitting testimony "[i]n so subjective a field as psychiatry" would undoubtedly lead to a " 'battle of
experts.' " Id. at 519, 442 A.2d at 1025. The ensuing battle would
consume undue court time and divert the jurors attention from the
real issue of the case-whether the defendant committed the crimeto questions concerning the reliability of the expert and whether the
defendant has the characteristics of a criminal.
The court indicated that one way to prove reliability is to show
that the evidence has "gained 'general acceptance' in the scientific
community." Id. at 521, 443 A.2d at 1026. Acceptance in the scientific community could have been proved by either presenting other
experts to testify or by presenting scientific and legal publications
which support this position. The court noted that the defendants had
done neither. The defendants did urge, however, that certain judicial
opinions supported their position that the evidence is reliable. The
court rejected these cases, finding that they only established the reliability of expert testimony concerning an individual's psychiatric condition not the reliability of psychiatric testimony that an individual
"behaved in a particular manner on a specific occasion." Id. at 52223, 443 A.2d at 1027. The supreme court accordingly affirmed the
lower court's judgment excluding the evidence, holding that the defendants failed to show that the expert testimony was reliable and
therefore failed to fulfill the requirement of rule 56. Id. at 526, 443
A.2d at 1029.
The defendants advanced an additional argument whereby they
hoped to invoke a limited doctrine set forth by the United States
Supreme Court. This doctrine provides that certain exclusions of testimony from defense witnesses were held to have prevented a fair trial
and, therefore, these exclusions resulted in a violation of the sixth
amendment. Id. at 526-27, 443 A.2d at 1029-30. The cases supporting
this doctrine involved direct and crucial evidence by a defense witness
where there were clear indications of reliability upon which the state
had or could have relied. The doctrine also provides that such evidence cannot be arbitrarily or mechanically excluded simply because
it was proferred from a suspect category of defense witnesses when
exclusion would defeat the ends of justice. The court rejected this
argument holding that, in the present case, expert character testimony
based upon an unaccepted scientific principle is not the equivalent of
direct testimony from an accomplice or witness to a crime. Furthermore, the exclusion of the expert character testimony in the present
case was based upon clear indications that the testimony is unreliable
and not on arbitrary state rules of evidence presuming the testimony
to lack credibility. Id. at 527-28, 443 A.2d at 1030.
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The Cavallo court has drawn clear guidelines for the admissibility of expert character testimony. While it is generally considered
relevant, and therefore admissible under rule 47, expert character
testimony must meet the more stringent requirement of reliability
under rule 56 (2). Although it is recognized that it is within psychological expertise to determine certain kinds of mental illness and the
amenability to cure, see id. at 524-25, 433 A.2d at 1028, Cavallo
indicates that it is not scientifically certain whether mental characteristics peculiar to persons who commit certain acts can be determined
and that particular individuals having these characteristics can be
identified. "Until the scientific reliability of this type of evidence is
established, it is not admissible." Id. at 529, 433 A.2d at 1030.
R.R.M.

LANDLORD

AND

TENANT-EVICTION-OCCUPANTS

FROM DWELLINGS BECAUSE OF BUILDING

DISPLACED

PERSONS

UNDER

EVICTED

CODE VIOLATIONS ARE

RELOCATION

ASSISTANCE

ACT-

McNally v. Township oJ Middletown, 182 N.J. Super. 622, 442
A.2d 1075 (App. Div. 1982).
Buildings occupied by the plaintiffs, Ethel McNally and Patricia
Dolan, were condemned by the building inspector of the defendant,
Township of Middletown, and the occupants were evicted. McNally
and Dolan applied for relocation and rental assistance as displaced
persons pursuant to the Relocation Assistance Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
20:4-1 to :4-22 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982), and the Relocation
Assistance Law of 1967, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:31B-1 to :31B-12
(West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982). The Monmouth County Board of
Social Services declared that the parties were entitled to receive assistance, and the township commenced payments. When state funding
for such assistance was reduced, the township halted payments to the
plaintiffs. McNally and Dolan appealed the termination of payments
and the presiding administrative law judge determined that the plaintiffs were included within the statutory definition of displaced persons. Thus the defendant was legally obligated to recommence payments. This ruling was adopted by the Commissioner of the
Department of Community Affairs as a final decision and the defendant appealed to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New
Jersey. 182 N.J. Super. at 623-24, 442 A.2d at 1076.
On appeal, the defendant township contended it did not acquire
ownership of the plaintiffs' dwellings as required for N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 20:4-1 to :4-22 to apply, and therefore, the plaintiffs could not be
considered displaced persons under the statute. The court decided that
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the legislative intent of the Relocation Assistance Act was not quite so
narrow, holding that occupant evacuation forced by building code
violations would make the occupants displaced persons even though
the municipality had not acquired ownership of the property. 182
N.J. Super. at 625-26, 442 A.2d at 1077. The court also ruled that the
legislative intent to delegate broad power to the Commissioner in
interpreting the statute barred the defendant's argument that the
Commissioner had exceeded his authority in issuing a regulation containing a definition of displaced persons that included individuals in
the plaintiffs' situation. Id. at 626, 442 A.2d at 1077.
The court, however, did find one of the defendant's contentions
to have merit. One requirement of N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 20:4-1 to :4-22
is that in order to be considered a displaced person, the party has to
occupy the building pursuant to a certificate of occupancy and also
occupy the dwelling for ninety days or more prior to eviction. It was
undisputed that McNally met these statutory requirements. See 182
N.J. Super. at 627, 442 A.2d at 1077. Therefore, the court affirmed
the findings of the administrative law judge as adopted by the Commissioner. But Dolan's length of stay in her building before eviction
was in dispute and there was also some doubt as to whether Dolan
occupied the dwelling pursuant to a valid certificate of occupancy.
Therefore, the court reversed the final decision of the Commissioner
with respect to Dolan and remanded the case to the Commissioner to
make proper findings of fact on these matters. Id. at 627, 442 A.2d at
1077-78.
The appellate court's decision clarifies the meaning of the term
displaced persons under N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 20:4-1 to :4-22 and N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 52:31B-1 to :31B-12. Pursuant to the court's ruling, a
municipality must financially assist those persons it causes to be
evicted from their dwellings, with the purpose of the eviction being
immaterial.
R.C.N.

MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE- MALPRACTICE-PHYSICIAN'S DELIBERATE FALSIFICATION OF PATIENTS' MEDICAL RECORDS REGARDED AS

GRoss MALPRACTICE AND BASIS FOR LICENSE REvOCATION-In re
Jascalevich, 182 N.J. Super. 455, 442 A.2d 635 (App. Div. 1981).
The New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners brought a complaint against Dr. Jascalevich alleging conduct amounting to gross
malpractice or gross neglect and professional incompetence. The
Board designated a hearing officer to investigate the allegations and
make recommendations based on his findings. Following a lengthy

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:198

hearing, the officer found that Dr. Jascalevich's conduct had fallen
below appropriate professional standards but only to the degree of
ordinary negligence. He recommended against revoking or suspending
Dr. Jascalevich's license. The Board accepted the factual findings of
the hearing officer but concluded that Dr. Jascalevich's acts amounted
to gross malpractice, negligence, and professional incompetence thus
falling within the scope of the statute for disciplinary actions against
physicians. The Board also found that Dr. Jascalevich "lack[ed] the
good moral character requisite for the practice of medicine" and
consequently it ordered that his license to practice medicine and
surgery be revoked. 182 N.J. Super. at 458, 442 A.2d at 637.
The Board's conclusion that Dr. Jascalevich's conduct necessitated disciplinary action was based upon his treatment of two patients
and subsequent record keeping. In July 1974, Mario E. Jascalevich,
M.D., performed a routine operation to remove the gall bladder of
Julio Echeverria. Because of complications, a second operation was
performed one week later. The doctor's postoperative diagnosis indicated the possibility of cancer. Id. at 459, 442 A.2d at 637. Yet,
Echeverria was neither treated for cancer nor referred to a specialist
for treatment. Id. at 459-60, 442 A.2d at 637-38. A third operation
performed by Dr. Jascalevich nine months later solved Echeverria's
problems and "clearly demonstrated that he never did have any . . .
cancer." Id. at 460-61, 442 A.2d at 638. Despite this finding Dr.
Jascalevich's medical report, prepared six months after the third operation, indicated that surgery was performed in response to a pathological report of cancer in Echeverria. The Board believed that the
doctor invented the cancer diagnosis as an explanation for an accident
which occurred during the original surgery. Id. at 461, 442 A.2d at
638. In an incident involving another patient, it was discovered that
the doctor permitted a patient's original operative report to be substituted in the hospital record with one bearing false signatures. Id. at
465, 442 A.2d at 641.
On appeal by the doctor, the appellate division initially addressed the issue concerning the proper standard of proof for medical
disciplinary proceedings. The court found that the hearing officer's
use of the clear and convincing. standard was appropriate, and despite
the Board's opinion that a preponderance standard was sufficient, its
acceptance of the officer's findings was a tacit assent to the higher
standard. Id. at 459, 442 A.2d at 637.
Regarding the substantive issues, the court relied on the Board's
review of the factual findings and held that a physician's deliberate
falsification of his patients' medical records constitutes gross negligence. Id. at 472, 442 A.2d at 645. The court examined at length Dr.
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Jascalevich's claim that a finding of lack of good moral character is
insufficient for license revocation. See id at 470, 442 A.2d at 644.
While agreeing that N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-16 (c) (West 1978) refers
to moral character solely in regard to a disciplinary action based on a
plea or conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude, the court
was unwilling to concede that the requirement of good moral character for initial licensing, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-6 (West 1978), was
limited to the initial licensing process. 182 N.J. Super. at 470, 442
A.2d at 644. Noting that the issue was one of first impression in the
physician-disciplinary context, the court examined decisions in other
professional licensing cases and concluded that the requisite good
moral character was an equally valid basis for revoking or suspending
a previously granted physician's license. Id. at 470-71, 442 A.2d at
644. Notwithstanding this determination, the court opined that the
basis for the Board's finding of a lack of good moral character "also
directly implicate[d] basic professional standards of practice and competence." Id. at 471, 442 A.2d at 644.
Finally, the court summarily dismissed Dr. Jascalevich's claims
that the Board arbitrarily abused its discretion and that the role
played by its President was unauthorized. The court commented that
in this situation, deference to the administrative agency's findings was
both reasonable and permissible, and that the Board's proceedings
conformed to the proper standards of due process. Id. at 472, 442
A.2d at 645.
This decision addresses for the first time whether the lack of good
moral character is grounds for the revocation or suspension of a
physician's license. The appellate division's approval of this basis indicates a willingness to use a teleological interpretation of restrictive
statutory language when reviewing the proceedings of an administrative agency. Also of significance is the court's affirmation of the
application of the clear and convincing standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings against a physician.
s.J.C.
REAL PROPERTY-JOINT TENANCY-GIFr

ASSIGNMENT OF MORT-

GAGE AGAINST PROPERTY TO ONE TENANT BY ENTIRETY PRESUMED
FOR BENEFIT OF BOTH COTENANTS REGARDLESS OF ASSIGNEE'S IN-

Estate of Colquhoun v. Estate of Colquhuon, 88 N.J. 558,
443 A.2d 1045 (1982).
TENT-

On August 16, 1973 Robert G. Colquhoun and Elizabeth Colquhoun purchased a house in Basking Ridge as tenants by the entirety
with funds supplied by their son, Robert F. Colquhoun. They exe-
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cuted a bond and purchase money mortgage for a term of twenty-five
years which specified repayment of a $35,000 lump sum in one year
and monthly payments amortizing the balance over the remaining
twenty-four years. The only payment made was the $35,000 lump
sum on August 31, 1974. 88 N.J. at 560-61, 443 A.2d at 1046-47. On
June 8, 1978, the son executed an assignment of the mortgage as a gift
to his father individually and it was recorded on June 9, 1978. Robert
G. died testate on October 14, 1978, leaving his entire estate to his
brothers and sisters. The Basking Ridge residence, however, devolved
to Elizabeth as surviving spouse. Upon the request of Elizabeth's
attorney, Robert F. executed a partial release for the lump sum paid
in 1974, which was recorded on March 13, 1979. Elizabeth died
testate on May 29, 1979, leaving another son, Owen, as her primary
beneficiary and executor. A contract was executed for the sale of the
residence at a price substantially in excess of the original purchase
price but the sale was frustrated by the recorded existence of the
mortgage for which Robert's estate demanded payment in full of the
unpaid principal amount plus interest. Elizabeth's executor brought
suit for release of the mortgage and setoff of one-half the amount
claimed due on the mortgage. Id. at 561, 443 A.2d at 1047.
The trial court granted relief pendente lite and ordered the mortgage cancelled and also ordered that an amount sufficient to cover the
principal balance and accrued interest be placed in escrow. Summary
judgment was granted Robert's estate for the entire outstanding principal and accrued interest on the theory that the property was encumbered by that amount when Elizabeth became sole owner upon Robert's death. Id. at 562, 443 A.2d at 1047. The appellate division
reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Elizabeth's
estate, reasoning that when the mortgage was assigned to Robert, it
was presumed to be for the benefit of both cotenants and because the
mortgage merged with the fee, Elizabeth was in no way indebted
therefor. 177 N.J. Super. 491, 498, 427 A.2d 87, 90-91 (App. Div.
1981). The supreme court granted certification. 87 N.J. 362, 434 A.2d
1052 (1981).
Justice Schreiber, writing for the majority, recognized that the
status of a mortgage received as a gift by one tenant by the entirety
could be decided on competing yet equally sound legal theories. There
was no dispute that had Elizabeth predeceased her husband, sole
ownership of the fee and mortgage would have accomplished a merger and extinguished the obligation. 88 N.J. at 562, 443 A.2d at 104748. However, without the gift assignment to Robert G., upon the
death of Robert G., Elizabeth would have come into possession of the
fee encumbered by the entire mortgage for which her son would have
been entitled to demand full payment. The contention that Robert's
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estate should have been accorded the same right was, therefore, "arguably sound." Id. at 563, 443 A.2d at 1048. Justice Schreiber also
noted, however, that cotenants are placed in a fiduciary relationship
when they hold property "under the same instrument" thus the duty
"to sustain and protect the common title" is created. Id. at 563-64,
443 A.2d at 1048. The court additionally acknowledged the general
principle that the benefit created by a cotenant's actions in protecting
or enhancing the property interest with respect to an adverse claim
inures to the cotenant; accordingly, the cotenant is obligated to contribute his proportionate share of any cost to satisfy such a claim
within a reasonable time. Id. at 564, 443 A.2d at 1048. The court
further observed that the appellate division, in concluding that the
mortgage had merged, failed to consider the respective parties' intent
with regard to merger. In the instant case, the facts clearly demonstrated that the assignee did not contemplate merger. Id. at 565, 443
A.2d at 1049.
Justice Schreiber attempted to reconcile these conflicting common law and equitable principles in light of the complicating fiduciary relationship of the parties. Id. at 566, 443 A.2d at 1050. As an
admitted compromise, the court decided that the fair result would be
to assess Elizabeth's estate liability for one-half the mortgage amount
plus interest due thereon as of the date of Robert's death in favor of his
estate. Id. at 567-68, 443 A.2d at 1050.
Justice Pashman dissented, contesting the fairness of the majority's decision. He concluded that Elizabeth's estate was liable for onehalf of all mortgage payments due until Robert's death and all payments due after that date. He specifically pointed out that precedent
barred accrual of any debt on property owned as tenants by the
entirety to the predeceasing spouse's estate based on the principle that
the sole surviving owner of the property should assume all future
debts, particularly when the value of the property exceeds those debts.
Calling attention to the majority's recognition that had the mortgage
not been assigned to her cotenant Elizabeth's estate would have been
fully liable for all payments due after Robert's death, Justice Pashman
reasoned that assignment to her cotenant would not change that
obligation in the face of specific intent not to merge the interests. The
mortgage was wholly owned by Robert's estate upon his death and,
therefore, became a liability of Elizabeth's estate. Id. at 569, 443 A.2d
at 1051 (Pashman, J., dissenting). He also questioned the justification
for extending the time within which a cotenant may reasonably contribute to the benefit of the property interest beyond the lifetimes of
those cotenants. Justice Pashman maintained that reinstatement of the
judgment against Elizabeth's estate for the entire mortgage amount,
reduced by one-half the payments owed up to the time of Robert's
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death would be the fairest result. Id. at 570, 443 A.2d at 1050-51
(Pashman, J., dissenting).
The majority's attempt to be "fair" to the interests of all parties
may result in considerable confusion regarding the rights and duties of
cotenants notwithstanding the existence of well established precedents
and equitable principles in this area.
J.P.B.

TAXATION-JUDGMENTS-FREEZE ACT EXPANDED To PROTECT FINAL
JUDGMENTS BASED UPON STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT-South

PlainfieldBorough v. Kentile Floors, Inc., 183 N.J. Super. 359, 4
N.J. Tax 1, 443 A.2d 1122 (1982).
The taxpayer, Kentile Floors, Inc., had appealed an assessment
of local property taxes for the years 1977, 1978, and 1979 to the Tax
Court of New Jersey. As a result of the appeals, a tax court judgment
"based upon a stipulation of settlement" was entered on March 24,
1980, assessing the property at $8,850,000 for each year. The same
property was then assessed at $10,597,800 for 1980. The taxpayer
appealed this assessment to the Middlesex County Board of Taxation,
and on October 29, 1980 the assessment was decreased to $8,850,000.
South Plainfield Borough, the taxing district, appealed this reduced
assessment to the Tax Court of New Jersey. South Plainfield asserted
that the reduced assessment was not an accurate evaluation of the
property. 183 N.J. Super. at 362, 4 N.J. Tax at 4, 443 A.2d at 1124.
The taxpayer contended that the Freeze Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:243 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982), barred a 1980 increase above the
1979 assessment. 183 N.J. Super. at 362-63, 4 N.J. Tax at 4, 443 A.2d
at 1124. The Freeze Act provides that a final judgment of the tax court
on the assessment of real property will be protected for two years
unless all the property in the district is reassessed or the value of the
specific property has changed after the assessment. N.J. STAT. ANN. §
54:2-43. The taxpayer moved for summary judgment, 182 N.J. Super.
at 362, 4 N.J. Tax at 4, 443 A.2d at 1124, since neither a district-wide
revaluation nor an increase in the value of the property was alleged by
the Borough. Id. at 363, 4 N.J. Tax at 5, 443 A.2d at 1124. Although
discovery was still pending, the tax court found that the motion could
be entertained in light of the absence of an issue of material fact. The
actual value of the property, the only issue open to discovery, was
held to be irrelevant to the operation of the Freeze Act. The Borough
argued that a "judgment based upon a stipulation of settlement" did
not come within the ambit of the Freeze Act. Id. at 364, 4 N.J. Tax at
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6, 443 A.2d at 1125. It contended that the Act only protected a "final
judgment" rendered by a court or board pursuant to an evidentiary
hearing.
The tax court after recognizing that whether the Freeze Act
applied to a "judgment based upon a stipulation of settlement unsupported by a factual hearing" was a question of first impression, id. at
367, 4 N.J. Tax at 8, 443 A.2d at 1126, disagreed with the Borough's
contention. The tax court interpreted the words "final judgment" to
mean a determination based on the merits of a claim. Id. at 365, 4
N.J. Tax at 6, 443 A.2d at 1125. They noted that these words were not
meant to preclude the application of the Freeze Act to judgments
based on settlements, but rather, to ensure that the Freeze Act could
not apply to judgments based upon the Act's prior operation. Id. at
365-66, 4 N.J. Tax at 6-7, 443 A.2d at 1125-26.
The Borough maintained that a comment to N.J. CT. R. 8:9-5
supported its position. The comment provides that a stipulated settlement of property taxes requires support by expert's affidavits and
possibly the assessor's affidavits. See S. PRESSLER, CUrRENT N.J. COURT
RULES, R. 8:9-5 comment 4 (1982). The tax court rejected this argument stating that although N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:2-42 had required
affidavits to support a "final judgment based upon a stipulation of
settlement," the statute was repealed in 1979 and replaced by N.J. CT.
R. 8:9-5 allowing judgment supported by only "such proof as the
Court may require." Since the comment relied upon by the Borough
reflected the language of the repealed statute rather than the current
court rule, the tax court determined that affidavits were no longer
absolutely required "prior to the entry of judgment." 183 N.J. Super.
at 368, 4 N.J. Tax at 8-9, 443 A.2d at 1127. The current rule left the
requirement of proof necessary for a settlement and entry of final
judgment pursuant thereto to the discretion of the tax court. Id. at
368, 4 N.J. Tax at 8, 443 A.2d at 1127.
Finally, the Borough contended that the Freeze Act was not
applicable to the last year of a three year settlement as it would result
in a five year freeze. In rejecting this argument, the court distinguished the instant case from Riverview Gardens, Section One, Inc. v.
Borough of North Arlington, 9 N.J. 167, 87 A.2d 425 (1952), in which
the Freeze Act was held inapplicable to a judgment based on a freeze
of an earlier judgment. 183 N.J. Super. at 369, 4 N.J. Tax at 10, 443
A.2d at 1127. The tax court emphasized that in the instant case there
was no attempt to apply the Act to an earlier judgment based on a
freeze since there had been no previous freeze. Instead, the court held
that the 1979 judgment "based upon a stipulation of settlement" was a
"final judgment within the meaning of the statute" and the 1980
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application of the Act to the 1979 judgment was proper. Id. at 370, 4
N.J. Tax at 11, 443 A.2d at 1128. Accordingly, the tax court granted
the taxpayer's motion for summary judgment. Id.
By extending the protection of the Freeze Act to "judgments
based on stipulations of settlement" the tax court has affirmed the
legal sufficiency of these judgments. This decision may encourage
taxpayers to resolve property tax assessment disputes by settlement
instead of resort to a time consuming hearing.
A.L.K.

